Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, four years on

As Ukrainians today mark their fourth year of defending against a Russian invasion — 11 years if you start the timer from Russia’s seizure of Crimea — peace looks no closer.

Why?

• First, let’s look at the battlefield.

Putin continues to claim marginal gains at staggering cost: he’s now averaging ~44,000 casualties a month (and rising) in return for 50-100 sq km per month (and slowing).

Or to put it other ways, while neither side seems near a breakthrough, and Ukraine’s situation remains difficult, Putin is now…

• losing as many troops as he can mobilise
• losing as many troops in a month as Moscow lost to Afghanistan in a decade, and
• holding less of Ukraine now than in June 2022 (after his Kyiv losses).

That bleak report card is partly why Zelensky keeps warning that any pause now simply means a break for Putin to regroup and try again — he can’t bank those losses.

• Second, let’s look at the negotiations.

401 days since President Trump returned to the White House vowing he’d end the war in a day, any US mediation efforts are still stalling, with last week’s Geneva talks no exception.

The main sticking point? Putin still insists Zelensky hand over Ukraine’s regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, even though Putin hasn’t managed to seize them all after four years of war (he’d need another century at current rates).

It’s not a realistic demand, particularly Ukraine surrendering its ultra-fortified ‘Donbas line’ in Donetsk — that’d be handing Putin a springboard to a full conquest.

But ‘unrealistic’ is the point: by insisting on impossible terms, Putin hopes to frame Zelensky — not himself — as the obstacle to peace. And maybe it’s working, because…

• Third, let’s look at the US role.

Trump 2.0 has shown flashes of pressure on Russia, whether via secondary sanctions on those keeping Putin’s economy afloat (China and India), or just last week extending the Obama/Biden-era sanctions regime for another year.

But in parallel, Trump has also cut direct US security assistance by ~99%, slashed intelligence sharing, and publicly pressured Zelensky to hand more land to Putin.

The EU’s own ramp-up has almost offset that US collapse, financing US arms sales to Ukraine to keep total security aid relatively stable. But while France is stepping in on the intel front, US battlefield, targeting, and early-warning capabilities are irreplaceable.

And the net result is a little discombobulating: per Trump’s years of pushing, Europe is now taking more of the lead in supporting Ukraine’s (and thus Europe’s) self-defence. But by cutting US support, Trump has also cut his own leverage to impose any settlement on Kyiv, not to mention any other European capital mindful of Putin’s broader ambitions.

And finally, that brings us to…

• Fourth, let’s look at Europe’s role.

Unsurprisingly-if-semi-cynically, Europe’s defence spending is directly correlated to Russian proximity: those who’ve survived Moscow’s past attacks and occupation (like Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) now spend 3.5-4.5% of their GDP on defence. Those further away, like Spain, Italy, and Portugal? They’re closer to NATO’s traditional 2% floor.

We spell that out because it hints at the dynamic still posing the biggest risk to European unity: Putin’s invasion hits different capitals in different ways, and the tension in how to respond, while natural and even by design, also risks becoming existential.

Brussels has managed to de-escalate internal spats so far, whether over Ukrainian wheat or refugees. But there’s always another spat around the corner, with stakes that just keep getting higher — eg, the latest tiff (energy) just took a spectacular turn:

• Instead of fixing Russia’s pipeline across Ukraine (or else!), Ukraine hit a Russian oil terminal 1,000km upstream, flipping the blame back onto Hungarian-Slovakian decisions to stay hooked on a warzone pipeline and the aggressor who wrecked it.

But spat or no spat, polling suggests Europeans now increasingly see Ukraine’s freedom as inseparable from their own.

Oh, and as for Ukraine’s own role? Four years ago, Zelensky warned Putin would see Ukrainian faces, not backs. Now fast-forward to today, and Ukraine is manufacturing half a million drones per month, its home-grown Flamingo cruise missile just hit an arms factory deep inside Russia, and ground troops retook ~300 sq km in a couple of weeks.

Maybe to ‘win’ this war by now, Zelensky really just needs not to lose.

Intrigue’s Take

So that’s a brief reflection on why this war is still raging after four years. It’s also worth a quick reflection on how this war has already shaped our world, starting with…

• First, this conflict has revived old-school warfare (trenches, artillery) in some ways, but revolutionised it in others (drones).
• Second, it’s weakened the world’s nuclear non-proliferation regime, as more capitals (Seoul, Tokyo, Warsaw, and beyond) ponder nukes to avoid Ukraine’s fate.
• Third, it’s exacerbated the world’s paranoia, as spooked capitals rush to secure their own food, energy, critical materials, tech, finance, and beyond.
• Fourth, it’s shattered Europe’s post-Cold War complacency, with key capitals rapidly ditching sacred cows (debt brake, joint debt) to awaken the bloc, and…
• Fifth, polls suggest near-majorities of both the public and insiders across the West now see WW3 as increasingly likely over the next 5-10 years.

And it’s hard to make this last point without seeming a tad unkempt, but it’s true: much like us (say) shaking our heads at a 1939 Senator Borah dismissing WWII fears when WWII was already underway, our grandkids might one day marvel at today’s polls fearing some future WW3, given the non-zero chance WW3 is already underway: Putin already needs North Korean troops, China’s industry, and Iranian drone tech to keep his invasion rolling, against a young democracy backed by the free world’s capital, arms, and resolve.