The UN backs Trump’s Gaza plan – will it work?

After weeks of haggling, the UN Security Council (UNSC) has approved the US-led plan for post-war Gaza, with 13 in favour, two abstentions (Russia/China), and none against.

In short, Resolution 2803 (2025) endorses: 

• Trump’s ‘Board of Peace’ overseeing Palestinian technocrats to initially run Gaza
• An International Stabilisation Force (ISF) to secure the strip 
• The gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces to a “security perimeter” in Gaza, and 
• The “full resumption” of aid overseen not by Israel or Hamas, but the Board of Peace.

The Security Council authorised it all at least through the end of 2027, with the US now hustling to get the ISF into Gaza as soon as January.

In the meantime, here are the four biggest questions you need to know: 

1. Who’s on the Board of Peace? 

President Trump says he’ll chair, and Tony Blair’s name is in the mix as another member, though Blair’s stint dragging the UK into Iraq makes him (ahem) a controversial pick. 

Trump says he’ll announce the Board — featuring “the most powerful and respected leaders throughout the world” — in coming weeks. Negotiations are likely still underway, though UNSC endorsement will now push some initial “maybes” into the “yes” column.

From Trump’s perspective, getting the biggest names onboard will maximise the plan’s credibility, buy-in, and therefore chances of success. But success also depends a lot on…

2. Who will deploy troops to Gaza? 

This is a chicken-egg situation, with no obvious exit:

• Hamas is refusing to disarm, and linking any foreign troops to Israeli occupation
• Azerbaijan is saying it’ll only send troops once the fighting stops
• Indonesia’s troops will only help with aid and reconstruction, and
• Israel is vetoing any military presence from regional rival Turkey.

So… who’s actually going to stare Hamas down? Israel’s two brutal years of war couldn’t fully dislodge Hamas, so will this ISF fare any better?

Arab/Muslim forces would enjoy the most legitimacy, though it was several same nations who were among the most vocal critics of Israel’s own Hamas war. So what happens when their own soldiers now return home in a body bag? Or cause more Gazan civilian deaths?

It’s a massive military, reputational, and political risk for any nation volunteering troops. That might be why the Emiratis are already declining (though they flagged legal doubts).

And even if this ISF reaches the combat strength necessary to disarm Hamas, then…

3. What happens after two years? 

The idea is for the ISF to eventually hand Gaza’s administration back to the secular-nationalist Palestinian Authority (which ran Gaza pre-Hamas, and is still in the West Bank).

That unelected Authority (the PA) — deeply unpopular among Palestinians — has committed to a bunch of reforms and even elections to boost its credibility and effectiveness in time to resume control in Gaza. But even if you consider two years is like half a century in Middle East geopolitical years, is even that enough time for…

• the PA to rebuild?
• the ISF to disarm Hamas? and/or…
• Egypt to train and vet an entirely new police force…?

So there’s a risk this arrangement keeps getting rolled over, a little like the UN’s support for Palestinian refugees way back in 1949, now extended as the UNRWA every three years… ~25 times!

And if this Plan does need the Security Council to approve extensions, then we must ask…

4.  Why did Russia and China abstain? 

Their official reasons (here and here) are that the plan is a) too vague, b) sidelines Palestinians, c) skips (at Israel’s urging) any clear commitment to a two-state solution, and d) cedes too much power to a new, non-UN body.

But you can bet both missions also weighed up some unofficial reasons, like a preference not to contribute to a US win. Similarly, the more the US is tied up in Gaza, the less the US can focus on (say) Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, or Xi’s ambitions over Taiwan.

Anyway, the costs of blocking Trump’s plan — particularly with key players onboard — were clearly outweighed by the benefits of just waving it through, then maybe crowing “told you so” down the track. But will they reach the same calculation in 2027, 2029, or 2031…?

Intrigue’s Take

We’ve explored this war and any possible exits a bunch of times over the years, but there’s actually some broader significance for the UN itself here.

First, the fact everyone wanted UNSC signoff before going beyond Gaza’s initial ceasefire is a signal the UN still holds the moral authority and political legitimacy capitals crave.

Second, the fact the UNSC agreed on a massive new course of action is a signal the UN can still be effective, particularly after years of gridlock over (say) whether to even mention the Hamas attacks, or use the word “ceasefire”, “pause”, or “truce”.

Of course, whether or not either of the above two positive points might now nudge the US back to paying its UN dues is another question entirely. To the contrary, this might actually hint at where the UN is headed: towards a leaner future dispensing / withholding legitimacy, while leaving actual implementation to member states.

But back to where we started: this particular UNSC-endorsed plan is clearly imperfect, but it’s also clearly the closest we’ve come to breaking a miserable cycle.

So keep an eye on the next two big steps: who’s on the Board, and who sends troops.

Sound even smarter:

• Algeria is currently the Security Council’s only Arab member — it negotiated on behalf of the broader Arab group of nations.